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Abstract::  The existing literature emphasizes and contrasts the role of political checks and 
balances and legal origin in determining the pace of financial sector development.  This 
paper expands substantially on one aspect of this debate:  the fact that government actions 
that promote financial sector development, whether prudent financial regulation or secure 
property and contract rights, are public goods and sensitive to political incentives to provide 
public goods.  Tests of hypotheses emanating from this argument yield four new 
conclusions.  First, two key determinants of those incentives, the credibility of pre-electoral 
political promises and citizen information about politician decisions, systematically promote 
financial sector development.  Second, these political factors, along with political checks and 
balances, operate in part through their influence on the security of property rights, an 
argument asserted but not previously tested.  Third, contrary to findings elsewhere in the 
literature, the political determinants of financial sector development are significant even in 
the presence of controls for legal origin.  Finally, and again in contrast to the literature, the 
evidence here suggests that legal origin primarily proxies for political phenomena.  Legal 
origin is a largely insignificant determinant of financial sector development when those 
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dTwo strands of analysis dominate the literature that analyzes the institutional sources 
of financial sector development.  Both agree that governments prone to expropriation stifle 
growth on both sides of bank balance sheets:  depositors are unwilling to risk their funds in 
expropriable bank accounts; bankers are unwilling to lend to those who might abscond with 
the funds under the protective umbrella of a sympathetic government; investors are 
unwilling to capitalize banks whose profitability is placed at risk by the prospect of 
government expropriation.  However, the political economy literature underlines the role of 
political checks and balances to ensure the credibility of government commitments not to 
expropriate actors in financial markets.  The finance literature argues for the primacy of legal 
systems as guarantors of private rights.   
Several issues remain unresolved in this literature, including the role of political 
factors other than political checks and balances and the extent to which the effects of 
political institutions and legal origins are robust to systematic tests.  This paper makes four 
contributions that address these issues.  First, it presents the first cross-country evidence, 
using objective indicators of political institutions, that political checks and balances are 
important for financial sector development.  However, government policy is also influenced 
by the conditions of political competition and not only by the institutions of government 
policy making.  The security of property rights and the efficient regulation of banks are both 
public goods and the conditions of political competition determine political incentives to 
provide public goods.  A second contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that these 
conditions, particularly the credibility of pre-electoral political promises and citizen 
information about political decisions, are also significant determinants of financial sector 
development.  Third, empirical work below demonstrates for the first time that all of these   2
 
political influences operate in part through their impact on the security of property and 
contract rights in countries.   
Finally, estimates below demonstrate that the political determinants of financial 
sector development are robust to controls for legal origin.  More revealing, after controlling 
for the potential endogeneity of political influence, legal origins have no significant impact 
on financial sector development.  This suggests that legal origins capture unobserved 
historical influences that condition the political evolution of countries; when that evolution 
is modeled directly, the impact of the legal origins proxies falls accordingly. 
Political and legal influences on financial sector development 
Most work on financial sector development focuses on the role of political 
institutions – particularly political checks and balances; on the incentives of political decision 
makers and particularly the economic interest of their constituents; and on the origins of a 
country’s legal system.  The work here tests these links and introduces other political 
characteristics of countries into the debate. 
Political checks and balances  
Political checks and balances increase the chances that a potential target of 
expropriation is represented in government and can block the expropriation decision.  North 
and Weingast (1989) underline the importance of political checks and balances as a source of 
credible commitment in the context of the financial sector.  The role of checks and balances 
is also thoroughly documented in other areas in which government credibility is at issue (e.g., 
by Keefer and Stasavage (2003) in the case of monetary policy).   
However, the necessity of checks and balances as a precondition for financial sector 
development and economic growth has been called into question by Haber, Razo and 
Maurer (2003) and others.  They have demonstrated that the autocratic Porfirio Díaz regime   3
 
in Mexico was able to stimulate financial sector growth and economic growth more generally 
by making self-enforcing or externally-enforced arrangements that allocated privileged 
bankers and industrialists high rents.  Despite the empirical and theoretical caveats to the 
argument about political checks and balances, however, the empirical work below shows that 
political checks and balances are a robust determinant of financial sector development.  
While acknowledging irrefutable evidence that autocrats can craft credible agreements with 
bankers and industrialists, the evidence suggests that in general they are less able to do this 
than governments nested in a system endowed with political checks and balances. 
Economic interests, politics and financial sector development 
The evidence presented below also emphasizes the role that other political 
conditions play.  This is a theme that has emerged as well in the financial sector literature.  
Revisiting the evidence presented in North and Weingast (1989), Stasavage (2003) 
emphasizes that the credibility of governments depends on more than the presence of 
multiple veto players, but also on the interests of veto players.  He argues that only when 
veto players in the British Parliament began to care about the cost of capital did interest rates 
paid by England on sovereign loans begin to drop.  Similarly, research into the political 
economy of financial sector regulation has tended to focus most on the political interests of 
politicians.  The experiment, seen throughout the literature, particularly in American politics, 
is to ask whether legislators’ voting records reflect the economic interests that prevail in their 
electoral districts.  Kroszner and Strahan (1996), Kroszner and Stratmann (1998), Broz 
(2002) and many others have demonstrated power of these arguments, showing that 
economic interests within districts are significant determinants of legislator voting behavior 
with respect to the financial legislation.    4
 
The interest group approach to political economy is hard to extend to the question 
of why property rights, credibility or financial sector development are greater or faster in 
some countries than in others.  The US is a fairly unique laboratory for identifying the role 
of economic interests, because of low district magnitudes (the number of legislators per 
electoral district is either one or two), weak party control over the nomination process and 
because of ample data.  At the same time, while it is possible that policy differences across 
countries are purely a reflection of differences in the types and alignments of economic 
interests in a country, there is little qualitative evidence that this is the case.  The empirical 
tests below therefore look to underlying characteristics in the nature of political competition 
that affect government incentives to cater to special interests at the expense of citizens at 
large.  Two characteristics are, in particular, prominent in the literature: citizen information 
about the actions of political decision makers and the credibility of pre-electoral political 
promises.   
Legal origins and financial sector development 
A prominent approach, particularly in the finance literature, is to trace the financial 
development of countries back to their legal origins.  The law and finance literature (the 
seminal contributors to which are La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, e.g., 
1998) has presented substantial evidence that legal origin is significantly associated with a 
variety of aspects of government performance and that, specifically, countries of English, 
German or Scandinavian legal origin perform significantly better on numerous dimensions 
than countries with legal systems rooted in French or socialist legal traditions.  To explain 
these outcomes this literature argues that, in contrast to French or socialist legal systems, the 
English common law tradition offered judicial protection of private property rights against 
predation by the state.  The German legal system, though also in the civil law tradition   5
 
adopted by the French, was consciously intended to be more amenable to change than the 
French.  The Scandinavian was close to the German.   
Particularly among legal scholars, these arguments have aroused considerable 
controversy.  On the one hand, scholars dispute whether the posited differences in French 
and German systems (e.g., with respect to their dynamism) or between civil and common 
law systems (e.g., with respect to their acceptance of judge-made law) are correct (XXCITE, 
Gourevitch, Roe).  On the other, while the evidence has been overwhelming that legal origin 
matters, it is less clear that the evidence matches the specific hypotheses regarding the 
ranking of legal traditions outlined in the literature.   
For example, Beck, et al. (2001) compare the performance of countries with British, 
French and German legal origin to that of countries with socialist or Scandinavian legal 
origins.  The law and finance literature argues for the superiority of British common law, 
putting it at least on a par with the German legal tradition.  Beck, et al (2001) find, in 
contrast, that British legal origins are significantly less conducive than the German to 
financial sector development (credit to the private sector) and often not significantly 
different than the French.  The two advantages of German legal origin – bureaucratic 
efficiency and an expressed willingness to adapt the law to new circumstances – seem not to 
explain why the performance of systems of German origin perform markedly better than 
common law systems.  In common law (UK-style) systems, protection of private property 
against the predations of the state is more clearly enshrined.  In addition, common law 
systems are, by the very nature of the discretion given to judges in common law systems, 
regarded as highly adaptable.   
Regardless of these caveats, the empirical evidence in favor of the importance of 
legal origin for financial sector development has been compelling (see La Porta, et al. 1998   6
 
and many other or their contributions).  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) undertake 
a wide-ranging empirical investigation of the relative effects of political arrangements, legal 
origin and different historical factors on financial development.  They conclude that legal 
origin offers a substantially stronger explanation of financial development than political 
conditions.  They also present indirect evidence that legal origin is important not because of 
the historical factors that might condition special interest influence over the political process, 
but rather because some legal traditions are more adaptable – dynamic – than others. 
The analysis here differs with respect to the political hypotheses investigated and the 
political variables used.  In addition, a different approach is taken to examine whether legal 
origin captures distant historical forces that also condition current political competition – 
that is, that legal origin simply proxies for political forces.  These differences yield divergent 
conclusions from those in Beck, et al. (2001).  The results below indicate that the dynamics 
of political competition and political checks and balances matter significantly for financial 
sector development, whether or not legal origin is taken into account.  On the other hand, 
measures of legal origin are insignificant in specifications that control for the possibility that 
both political variables and financial sector development are influenced by unobserved 
factors.  
The conditions of political competition and financial sector development 
The political economy and legal origin literatures typically portray the security of 
property rights as the product of institutions that allow governments to credibly commit not 
to expropriate.  However, secure property rights can also be regarded as a public good and 
expropriation as a public bad.  In the typical case of expropriation, the government takes the 
assets of one economic actor and distributes them to others.  If expropriation were nothing 
more than the struggle of one narrow interest of society against another, political checks and   7
 
balances would resolve the struggle as long as each special interest controlled at least one of 
the veto gates in the political structure.  This depiction of expropriation ignores substantial 
social costs that are at the center of concern about the security of property rights, however.  
The risk of expropriation threatens all assets in a country.  Similarly, an act of expropriation 
imposes costs on all citizens and not only the target of expropriation.  The asset values and 
employment opportunities of all citizens depend on the rate of return that investors expect 
as a condition of placing fixed assets in a country.  That rate of return must rise when 
expropriation risks increase.  A policy of non-expropriation can therefore be seen as a public 
good that benefits all citizens in the same way that national defense does.  Similarly, the 
regulatory decisions of governments have public good attributes.  Regulatory failure in the 
financial sector leads to the economic disruption of a banking crisis or the costs of a slow-
growing financial sector.  These are felt broadly throughout an economy.   
Taken together, then, these arguments suggest that financial sector development 
should depend not only on the credibility of governments and on legal traditions, but also on 
the incentives of government decision makers to provide public goods. The literature has 
developed several explanations of the conditions under which governments have such 
incentives.  One of these is the sheer ability of citizens to take part in the political process 
influences government incentives to provide public goods.  Absent competitive elections 
and an enfranchised citizenry, the costs to “average” citizens of removing non-performing 
governments rise.  Unelected governments should therefore confront fewer political costs 
when they privilege themselves or narrow interests with private goods at the expense of 
citizens generally.   
Keefer (2004) finds that competitive elections are a strong and significant 
determinant of the magnitude of government fiscal transfers in the event of crisis.  That is,   8
 
elected governments face greater political costs from allowing insolvent banks to socialize 
the risks of imprudent lending.  Ultimately, elected governments face greater political costs 
when they attempt to make fiscal transfers to special interests (delinquent borrowers, 
careless depositors, imprudent bankers) at the expense of citizens generally.   
Of course, elections often fail to generate accountability.  In 1997 expropriation risk 
was the same or higher in 35 percent of countries exhibiting competitive elections than in 60 
percent of the countries that did not.1  Although the literature identifies several explanations 
for this, two are the focus here.  First, political competitors strive to gain electoral advantage 
by making claims to voters about what they will do if they take office.  If those promises are 
not credible, however, they do not affect the election and politicians have no reason to abide 
by them once they take office.  One precondition of credibility is that government actors 
confront a cost from reneging.  Such a cost might come in the form of damaged reputation.  
A second source of low credibility is voters’ lack of information about government policy 
actions and their connection to citizen welfare.  Without this information, it is not possible 
for citizens to verify whether politicians have taken the actions that they had promised prior 
to their election.  Absent verifiability, however, political promises are not credible.   
The analysis of information in the literature generally takes for granted the credibility 
of agreements and asks how imperfect voter information distorts outcomes.  Besley and 
Burgess (2004) do this, asking how imperfect voter information about politician type or 
actions allows worse outcomes than would otherwise prevail.  Grossman and Helpman 
(1996) argue that if voters are uninformed about candidate characteristics, candidates can 
spend money to persuade the voters of their qualities.  As in the credibility story, citizens in 
                                                 
1 The expropriation risk measure is from Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide and the 
measures of competitive elections from the Database on Political Institutions.  These are discussed below.  There 
was no difference at all between countries with and without competitive elections on another commonly used 
measure of property rights, the rule of law measure from the same source.   9
 
general suffer as politicians obtain resources to finance information campaigns by providing 
favors to special interests.  They assume, however, that candidate promises to citizens and to 
special interests are credible.   
If politicians are entirely non-credible and can do nothing about it, two outcomes are 
possible.  One is that politicians provide nothing to anyone. A second, introduced by 
Ferejohn (1986), is that voters are able to coordinate on a performance threshold below 
which they expel the poor performing incumbent and above which they re-elect him, 
independently of challenger characteristics, since challengers are not credible.  Keefer and 
Vlaicu (2004) argue, however, that politicians in fact try to overcome their credibility 
problems.  As they do this, they rely on clients and personalized transfers, provide little in 
the way of public goods and are able to engage in substantial corruption.  Insecure property 
rights and lack of attention to prudential regulation of the financial sector, is consistent with, 
though not directly predicted by these analyses.  The intuition is straightforward:  politicians 
who cannot make credible promises to the whole population try to make promises at least to 
a few.  These few do not internalize the costs of expropriation or risky financial sector 
regulation.   
Each of these – voter information and politician credibility prior to elections –
influence whether agreements between voters and politicians are credible.  Credibility in this 
case does not refer to the credibility of government commitments to continue particular 
policies in the future – for example, promises to bankers not to expropriate rents from 
financial transactions.  Instead, it refers to promises that politicians make to voters prior to 
elections.   
This is an unusual way to frame the political economy of financial sector issues.  On 
the one hand, government credibility is not usually conceived of as a public good.  On the   10
 
other, much of the political economy literature concerns conflict between special interests 
(large versus small banks, banks versus insurance companies, healthy banks versus insolvent 
ones).  The introduction of a conflict between narrow and broad interests and of the 
incentives of governments to provide public or private goods nevertheless contributes in 
two ways to our understanding of financial sector development.  It provides a single 
explanation for two phenomena usually treated separately (the security of property rights and 
the efficiency of regulation); an it helps to illuminate why countries with similar formal 
institutions exhibit such different levels of financial development.  
It is finally important to emphasize that these arguments are complementary to the 
institutional arguments surrounding political checks and balances.  In particular, political 
arrangements that give rise to political checks and balances may or may not encourage public 
good provision (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini 2000).  The arguments here are also 
complementary to the extensive research documenting the role of special or economic 
interests in the formulation of financial sector regulation.  Although research in American 
politics has clearly demonstrated that regulation is influenced by the competing demands of 
special interests, it does not tell us when regulation is more responsive to those competing 
demands than to the interests of citizens more broadly.   
Empirical approach 
The empirical investigation below examines financial sector development over two 
periods:  medium-term growth in the financial sector over the period 1975-2000 and long 
run growth, using the size of the  financial sector in 2000.  This mirrors the growth literature, 
most of which uses medium term growth (e.g., 1975-2000) and another of which examines 
the very long run (e.g., Hall and Jones (1999) or Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001,   11
 
2002).  These are appropriate time periods not only for growth, but for any fundamental 
aspect of economic development, such as financial sector growth.   
Corresponding to the two periods of financial sector development are two base 
empirical specifications, 
(1) Growth of the financial sector i (1975-2000) = β1+ β2ln(initial financial sector) i + 
β3(initial political/institutional variable) i +Xi ′β4  + εi 
and 
(2) Size of the financial sector i (2000) = β1+ β2 (initial political/institutional variable) i +Xi ′β3  
+ εi.  
Equation (1) allows medium term growth of the financial sector to vary with the initial size 
of the financial sector, analogous to medium-term growth regressions in which growth varies 
with the level of initial income per capita.  In the second equation, the initial size of the 
financial sector is omitted in order to preserve the long run character of the investigation.2  
These specifications raise numerous issues, the most important of which are:  what should 
be in X and how should one should address the potential endogeneity of the political and 
institutional variables?   
With respect to the first question, the base specification is parsimonious, following 
Beck, et al. (2001) in the financial literature and many others in the growth literature.  The 
argument behind parsimony is simple:  the effects of political institutions on financial sector 
development are likely to be both direct and indirect.  As a first approximation we would like 
to know the total effects of both.  Some specifications control in addition for income per 
capita in 1975.  This is a challenging test for the political hypotheses under consideration 
                                                 
2 Including 1975 financial sector size in equation 2 would render it nothing more than an investigation of 
growth over the period 1975 – 2000.     12
 
here, since there is a well-known correlation between income and variables related to 
democracy.  In addition, robustness checks for a number of other variables, including legal 
origin, are examined. 
Endogeneity is a second difficult issue.  As is always the case, one might be 
concerned either that economic variables drive political outcomes or that omitted factors 
determine both.  The first possibility is taken into account through the use of initial values of 
political institutions.  The second is more difficult.  Among the entire range of instruments 
typically used to control for the endogeneity of institutions in the literature, none are valid 
for the entire range of specifications examined here.  However, colonial origins (whether a 
country is of British, French or Spanish colonial origin) turn out to be valid for most 
specifications.   
Most of the literature on financial sector development gives prominence to the 
argument that the security of property and contract rights is key.  This is a core argument of 
North and Weingast (1989), which underlines the importance of political checks and 
balances for ensuring security of contract.  It is also a foundation of the literature on the 
importance of legal origins.  Beck, et al. (2001) summarize a key argument in the law and 
finance literature by arguing that “English common law evolved to protect private property 
owners against the crown” (p.2).  The argument here is that a variety of political attributes of 
countries contribute to the security of property rights, because they influence the willingness 
of governments to provide public goods generally.  None of these different arguments has 
been subjected to a fairly mechanical test:  is that component of secure property rights 
explained by political institutions, legal origins or the characteristics of political competition 
a significant determinant of financial sector development?     13
 
To assess this question, the following system and its analog for long-run financial 
sector development are estimated:   
(3) Security of property rights (1975) = β1+ β2ln(initial financial sector) i + 
β3(political/institutional variable) i +Xi ′β4  + εi 
(4) Growth of the financial sector i (1975-2000) = α1+ α2ln(initial financial sector) i + 
α3(predicted security of property rights) +Xi ′a4  + μi 
These regressions simply ask whether the component of secure property rights that can be 
explained by politics or political institutions is a significant determinant of financial sector 
development. 
Data 
The regressions below require data on financial sector development and the political 
characteristics of countries.  For the first, estimates below rely on private credit, total credit 
extended to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions.  This variable is the 
preferred measure of financial sector development in Beck, et al. (2001) and is taken from 
the Financial Structures Database of the World Bank (see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
2000).  Beck, et al. (2001) describe this as the preferred measure of financial sector 
development. 
Four different measures of political institutions or competition are evaluated here.  
All are taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, et al. 2001), running from 1975 – 
2000.  In contrast to the measures used in much of the literature, those here are all objective 
and easily replicable by others.  The checks indicator is an objective counterpart to a 
subjective measure often used to capture checks and balances, “Executive Constraints” from 
the Polity IV database.  It measures how many political actors can block proposed   14
 
legislation, therefore tracking whether formal institutions exist that potentially impose 
constraints on arbitrary behavior by the executive branch.3   
The checks variable captures the two ingredients identified by many as essential for 
secure property rights:  elections and checks on the executive branch.  However, unlike the 
Executive Constraints Polity IV measure, checks captures only the formal constraints on the 
executive that theory predicts should protect property rights, not whether those formal 
constraints are in practice binding.  It therefore constitutes a better test of theories of the 
role of institutions.   
The DPI also contains two variables assessing the competitiveness of elections, the 
Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness (LIEC, EIEC).  The 
executive index, EIEC, is used here.  This reaches its highest score (7) when multiple parties 
can and do compete for executive election and no party gets more than 75 percent of the 
vote.  A six means that one party receives more than 75 percent of the vote; a five that only 
one party ran for office though others could have and so on until one, indicating no 
elections were held.  Since most scholars would agree that only the most competitive 
category of EIEC is a reasonable approximation to elections, a dummy variable is used in 
the regressions here, equaling one when EIEC is seven and zero otherwise.   
The remaining two democracy variables capture distortions in the market for 
political office.  The first distortion is the lack of credibility of pre-electoral political 
promises.  The evidence in Keefer (2003) indicates that the performance of democracies 
                                                 
3 Beginning from a value of one (meaning that there is only one veto player and no checks and balances), this 
variable increments by one if countries have potentially competitive elections of the executive; by one in 
presidential systems if the legislature and presidency are controlled by different parties; in parliamentary 
systems, the value is incremented by the number of parties in the government coalition whose departure would 
cause the government to lose a majority; and in all systems by  one for each party supporting the government 
in the legislature whose with an ideological stance strongly differing from that of the executive’s party (see the 
DPI codebook for more details).     15
 
with fewer continuous years of competitive elections is starkly different from that of older 
democracies:  they are more corrupt, spend more on public investment and government jobs 
and exhibit lower secondary school enrollment, rule of law and bureaucratic quality – 
relations that are robust to a variety of specifications and endogeneity controls.  These policy 
differences can be best explained by the greater difficulties that competitors in younger 
democracies confront in making impersonal credible commitments to voters prior to 
elections.  From the DPI, one can calculate one how many years a country has continuously 
held competitive elections (where both the Executive and Legislative Indices of Competitive 
Elections equal seven).  The value of this variable (continuous years of competitive elections) in 1975 
is therefore used in the regressions below.4   
A large literature has also argued that voter information is critical to the effects of 
elections on incumbent behavior.  Following the empirical research in this literature (see, 
e.g., Adserà, et al. 2003), newspaper circulation from the World Development Indicators is therefore 
used as a proxy for the extent of voter information and its effect on growth.  The 1975 
(initial) values of all political variables are used here, with the exception of newspaper 
circulation.  To counter spotty coverage in any given year, the average of newspaper 
circulation over the period 1975 – 2000 is employed below. 
Instruments  
The literature uses a variety of instruments to identify the effects of institutions:  
distance from the equator (Hall and Jones 1999 use this to instrument for their index of 
social infrastructure), colonial heritage, years since the creation or independence of a country 
(Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003), settler mortality and urbanization in 1700 (Acemoglu, 
                                                 
4 The 1975 value of this variable in the DPI is actually taken from Clague, et al. (1996); values subsequent to 
1975 are updated according to the methodology explained in the text.  The use of values of persistence averaged 
over the 1975 – 2000 period does not change the results reported below.   16
 
Johnson and Robinson 2001, 2002).  In all cases, each of these instruments has been 
introduced into the literature as a measure of underlying political institutions rather than as a 
direct estimate of property rights.  As a consequence, to the extent that they are valid 
instruments for property rights in growth equations, one would expect them also, logically, 
to be reasonable instruments for institutions of various kinds in the growth equations.  In 
the current context, however, only colonial origin variables are (generally) valid.   
Other controls 
The specification here is parsimonious, allowing the estimates of institutional 
variables to reflect both their direct and indirect effects.  However, two additional controls 
are always included, land area and total population.  These capture exogenous variation 
across countries in the size of the market, which in turn might have a significant impact on 
the development of the financial sector.  Extensions of the base regressions encompass 
other variables, including the legal origin of countries.   
Results 
Tables 1 and 2 present the base results that support the main contentions of the 
paper.  Tables 1a and 1b, using, respectively, ordinary least squares and two-stage least 
squares estimates of equations (1) and (2), show that objective measures of political checks 
and balances and, to a lesser extent, competitive elections, have a significant influence on 
financial sector development.  These results stand in contrast to those reported by Beck, et 
al. (2001), but are consistent with the evidence in, for example, North and Weingast (1989).5  
After controlling for endogeneity the results strengthen:  both magnitudes and statistical 
                                                 
5 Beck, et al. (2001) show that initial values of subjective measures of democracy from the Polity III database 
are not significant determinants of financial sector development.  They also use current, not initial, values of the 
checks and balances measure used here and find it has a significant impact on financial sector development.     17
 
significance rise, while the F and J statistics reported in Table 1b support the claim, in five of 
six regressions, that the colonial heritage dummy variables are valid instruments.   
Table 1a:  Competitive elections, checks and balances and lending to the private 
sector 
  Competitive Elections (1975)  Checks and Balances (1975) 
Lending to the 
















































































2  .03 .36 19  .07  .38  .24 
N  78 93 116  78  93  116 
N.B.  p-values are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. Constants not 
reported. 
 
The magnitude of the effects is large.  The two-stage least squares estimate in Table 
1a suggests that financial sector growth over the period 1975 – 2000 was two percentage 
points per year faster in countries with competitive elections in 1975 than in countries 
without; the average for all countries was 2.2 percentage points per year.  Results for political 
checks and balances are equally large.  These estimates are particularly striking because most 
of the regressions in the two tables control for either the level of financial sector   18
 
development or initial per capita income in 1975.  Both of these are highly correlated with 
initial values of the political variables.   
Table 1b:  Two stage least squares estimates of Table 1a 
  Competitive Elections (1975)  Checks and Balances (1975) 
Lending to the 





















































































.45 .06 .17 .55  .68  .83 
N  78 91 103  78  91  103 
N.B.  p-values are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. Instruments for 
the fourth and eighth regressions are three dummy variables indicating whether a country 
has British, French or Spanish colonial origins.  Constants not reported. 
 
Whether elections or checks and balances matter most in cementing the credibility of 
government decisions is unclear in the literature.  North and Weingast (1989) argue for the 
importance of political checks and balances in the absence of competitive elections and a   19
 
universal franchise.  Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson (2001, 2002) argue for both, but 
Acemoglu and Robinson (XXUPDATE) emphasize the role of elections, arguing that it is 
only the threat of replacement by citizens that prevents governments from expropriating 
citizens.  Tables 1a and 1b reflect this ambiguity since the checks and balances variable in 
Table 1 takes into account the competitiveness of elections:  countries lacking competitive 
elections are assigned a one for this variable.   
Table 1c:  The effect of checks and balances, controlling for elections 
Lending to the 






























2  .08 .38 .24 
N  78 93 116 
N.B.  Table 1c uses the same specification as in the first three columns of Table 1a, with the addition 
of competitive elections.  Other controls and constants not reported.   p-values in parentheses, based 
on robust standard errors.  
 
We can easily ask, however, whether the effects of the checks variable is driven by 
elections or not by controlling for the competitiveness of elections in 1975 in the 
specifications of Table 1a.  These results are reported in Table 1c.  They strongly suggest 
that while elections are a pre-condition for political checks and balances, elections alone are 
not sufficient to guarantee the security of property rights.  On the other hand, Table 1c 
indicates that political checks and balances and elections, jointly, encourage faster financial 
sector development.  This implies, in turn, that although autocratic regimes, such as the Diaz 
regime studied by Haber, Razo and Maurer (2003), may be able to reach credible bargains   20
 
with bankers and industrialists sufficient to spur economic growth, such efforts are the 
exception rather than the rule. 
The second contention of the paper is that the effects of politics on financial sector 
development extend beyond the formal institutions of competitive elections and political 
checks and balances.  The evidence in Tables 2a and 2b supports this contention.  The 
ordinary least squares estimates in Table 2a indicate large effects of both the continuous 
years of competitive elections and average newspaper circulation.  A one standard deviation 
increase in the initial number of continuous years of competitive elections is associated with 
an increase in the rate of growth of the financial sector of 0.6 percentage points per year and 
with an increase in the size of the financial sector in 2000 of as much as 25 percent of GDP.  
Results for newspaper circulation are still larger.  These findings are robust to controls either 
for initial financial sector development or initial income, both of which are highly correlated 
with the two political variables.  They imply that government actions supportive of financial 
sector development, including the security of property rights, are public goods whose 
provision is sensitive to government incentives to provide public goods.   
If these variables accurately proxy the credibility of pre-electoral political promises 
and voter information, respectively, the results in Tables 2a and 2b underline the importance 
of a different kind of credibility for financial sector development.  When average citizens do 
not believe the promises of political competitors to provide such public goods as secure 
property rights or are unable to monitor the fulfillment of such promises, financial sector 
development slows.   
Table 2b investigates the sensitivity of these results to the potential endogeneity of 
the political variables to financial sector development.  Although the political variables 
remain highly significant, this exercise is less successful than in Table 1b.  The F-statistics   21
 
confirm that the colonial heritage dummies reported here, are significant predictors of the 
political variables.  However, the Hansen J-test rejects the assumption that these (or any 
other of the usual instruments) can be excluded from the second stage regressions.  
However, although one cannot reject the hypothesis that the results in Table 2a are driven 
by the endogeneity of the political variables, once legal origin variables are taken into 
account, as in tables 5 and 6 below, the same instrumental strategy succeeds in four of six of 
the regressions and the political variables remain strongly significant.   
Table 2a:  Continuous years of elections, newspaper circulation and lending to the 
private sector 
  Continuous years of 
competitive elections (1975) 
Average Newspaper Circulation 
(1975-2000) 
Lending to the 















































































2  .08 .36 .29 .11  .45  .43 
N  66 73 88 78  94  115 
N.B.  p-values are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. Constants not reported. 
 
The ordinary least squares estimates of the effects of both the continuous years of 
competitive elections and average newspaper circulation indicate large effects that are robust   22
 
to controls either for initial financial sector development or initial income, both of which are 
highly correlated with these two political variables.  A one standard deviation increase in the 
initial number of continuous years of competitive elections is associated with an increase in 
the rate of growth of the financial sector of 0.6 percentage points per year and with an 
increase in the size of the financial sector in 2000 of as much as 25 percent of GDP.  Results 
for newspaper circulation are still larger.   
Table 2b:  Two-stage least squares estimates of Table 2a 
  Continuous years of 
competitive elections (1975) 
Average Newspaper Circulation 
(1975-2000) 
Lending to the 





















































































.04 .02 .09 .05  .04  .05 
N  66 71 79 78  92  104 
N.B.  p-values are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. Instruments for the 
fourth and eighth regressions are three dummy variables indicating whether a country has British, 
French or Spanish colonial origins.  Constants not reported.   23
 
 
Table 2b investigates the sensitivity of these results to the potential endogeneity of 
the political variables to financial sector development.  Although the political variables 
remain highly significant, this exercise is less successful than in Table 1b.  All of the usual 
instruments, including the colonial heritage dummies reported here, are significant predictors 
of the political variables.  However, the Hansen J-test rejects the assumption that they can be 
excluded from the second stage regressions. 
The results in Tables 2a and 2b underline the importance of a different kind of 
credibility for financial sector development.  When average citizens do not believe the 
promises of political competitors to provide such public goods as secure property rights or 
are unable to monitor the fulfillment of such promises, financial sector development slows.  
Once again, however, one might argue that these two variables, meant to capture the 
dynamics of political competition, may instead reflect the influence of the excluded 
institutional variables, political checks and balances and elections.   
To examine whether this is the case, the regressions reported in Table 2c replicate 
those in Table 2a, controlling in addition for checks and balances.  This variable, as the 
earlier discussion indicates, takes into account both the presence of competitive elections 
and the number of veto players in government.  As the results in Table 2c indicate, there is 
little evidence that institutions drive the results in Table 2a.  The magnitude of the effects of 
the political variables is little changed by the inclusion of checks and balances.  In most cases 
the political variables are statistically significant and in all cases they are more significant than 
the checks and balances variable.   
Another measure of the size of the financial sector is liquid liabilities as a fraction of 
GDP (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of bank and non-bank financial 
intermediaries).  Liquid liabilities are an inferior measure of financial sector development   24
 
since they do not tell us the extent to which financial intermediaries actually channel funds to 
the private sector.  When the regressions in Tables 1 and 2 are repeated, substituting growth 
in liquid liabilities 1975 – 2000 or the level of liquid liabilities in 2000 for the corresponding 
private sector credit variables used earlier, the political variables are generally not significant 
in the ordinary least squares regressions.  However, the two-stage least squares results are at 
least as strong as when the private sector credit variable is used.  This pattern of results is 
consistent with the notion that liquid liabilities are a noisy measure of the financial sector, 
making results overall more sensitive to the noisiness of the independent variables.  Since 
instrumental variables reduce the noise in the potentially endogenous variable, results 
improve in the two-stage least squares estimates. 
Table 2c:  The effects of political credibility and voter information, controlling for 
political checks and balances  
  Continuous years of 
competitive elections (1975) 
Average Newspaper Circulation 
(1975-2000) 
Lending to the 
















































2  .10 .36 .32 .12  .43  .42 
N  66 73 88 78  93  114 
N.B. Table 2c uses the same specification as in Table 2a, with the addition of political checks and 
balances.   p-values are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. Constants and 
conditioning variables not reported. 
Politics, Property Rights and Financial Sector Development 
The arguments here echo the literature in claiming that the link from politics and 
political institutions to financial sector development passes through the security of property   25
 
rights.  The difference here is that secure property rights are seen as a consequence both of 
the political checks and balances that enhance the credibility of government policies, as in 
the literature, but also of the willingness of governments to provide public goods.  
Regardless of the underlying dynamics of the link, however, the empirical links in this chain 
have not been explicitly estimated.   Table 3 reports the estimates of equations 3 and 4 in the 
text above, a simple exercise that does just this.  
The measure of property rights follows Keefer and Knack (1995) and is the sum of 
four variables from the International Country Risk Guide (Political Risk Services):  the risk of 
expropriation, the enforceability of contracts with government, corruption and bureaucratic 
quality.  The earliest value of this variable, 1984, is used here.  It is well-known that the 
security of property rights is a significant determinant of financial sector development.  This 
result is reflected, for the specifications and data used here, in the first and third columns in 
Table 3.  These estimations are based on columns 1 and 2 in Table 1a, with the initial value 
of the property rights variable substituted for the political variable.   
Columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 are based on estimates of the system of equations 3 and 
4.  From equation 3, one extracts the predicted value of the security of property rights based 
on the particular political variable in the left-most column of Table 3.  In all cases, including 
the case of competitive elections, the 1975 values of the political variables are significant 
determinants of the security of property rights in 1984.  Equation 4 then estimates the effect 
of this predicted value of the property rights variable on financial sector development, which 
is the result reported in the cells of Table 3.  
From Table 3, it is immediately clear that all of the political variables, with the 
exception of competitive elections themselves, have a significant influence on financial 
sector development that runs precisely through their effect on the security of property rights.    26
 
However, only the significance of the checks and balances variable reflects the usual logic in 
the literature:  that political institutions influence the credibility of government policies by 
making them difficult to reverse.  The significance of years of competitive elections and 
newspaper circulation indicate a second channel is also at work: that the security of property 
rights is also a public good, the provision of which is influenced by the conditions of 
political competition. 
Table 3:  Does the effect of politics on financial sector development go through the 
security of property rights?  
Lending to the private 
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Growth 




Level 2000   







The component of property rights 
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N.B. Columns 1 and 3 use the specifications of columns 1 and 2 in Table 1a, substituting the 
property rights measure for the political variables in Table 1a.  Columns 2 and 4 report the results 
from estimating equation (4) in the main text, using the predicted value of the security of property 
rights from equation (3) in the main text.  The specification of the system of equations 3 and 4 is 
based on columns 1 and 2 in Table 1a, respectively.  The table presents the coefficient estimates for 
the respective political or property rights variables from 15 different regressions.  Correspondingly, 
no constants or conditioning variables are reported.  The p-values are reported in parentheses, based 
on robust standard errors.   
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Legal Origin, Politics and Financial Sector Development 
The role of legal origin is ignored in the foregoing estimations.  Implicitly, though, 
the role of politics in financial sector development is present in many of the arguments 
regarding the influence of legal institutions.  Some scholars argue that legal traditions are the 
direct product of political forces (La Porta, et al. 1998, Glaeser and Shleifer 2000xxupdate), 
for example emerging from the different choices rulers made to control bureaucratic 
malfeasance or recalcitrant barons.  At the same time, modern studies of judicial 
performance in the United States and elsewhere (e.g., Gely and Spiller, XXCITE), 
demonstrate unambiguously the dependence of judicial decision making on the preferences 
of political decision makers, just as other literature has demonstrated the influence of politics 
on other government institutions, even when they enjoyed de jure independence from 
politicians (e.g., on central banks, Keefer and Stasavage 2003).  Those same political forces 
might be expected to influence political institutions and the dynamics of political 
competition over the periods under consideration here.   
In fact, there is a significant relationship between legal origin variables and each of 
the political variables under consideration here.  An easy way to see this is to group together 
those legal origins regarded in the literature as being more conducive to the protection of 
private property rights, the English, German and Scandinavian.  A variable that takes a value 
of one if a country has English, German or Scandinavian legal origins and a zero otherwise is 
a significant determinant of the political variables here, controlling for the logarithm of per 
capita income in 1975.  This certainly does not suggest that legal origin determines political 
systems, but rather that historical forces may determine both.   
Evidence presented in Beck, et al. (2001) indicates that legal origins are the 
predominant determinant of financial sector development and that political variables have   28
 
little impact, whether or not one controls for legal origins.  The variables they use to test 
their political hypotheses are subjective indicators from the Polity IV database.  The results 
presented earlier already indicate that political measures different than the ones they employ 
are highly significant determinants of financial sector development.  There remains the 
question, therefore, of whether these political results survive the introduction of  controls 
for legal origin.   
Given the potential political roots of legal institutions, it is not obvious that one 
should examine the robustness of tests of political hypotheses of financial sector 
development with respect to controls for legal origin.  Political variables may be insignificant 
in the presence of legal origin variables simply because the latter embed political 
circumstances that more directly capture political incentives towards the financial sector than 
the political variables themselves. With this caveat in mind, however, we can nevertheless ask 
whether the direct political measures used here are “robust” to the presence of legal origin 
controls.   
As in Beck, et al. (2001), legal origin dummies are simply added to the base 
specifications – in this case, to the specifications in Tables 1a and 1b, and 2a and 2b.  Here, 
in a slight variation on their approach, the Scandinavian legal dummy is substituted for the 
French.  This allows all of the legal traditions that are thought to be most conducive to 
financial sector development, the British, French and German traditions,  to be compared to 
those that are thought to be less conducive. 
Results in the first three columns of Table 4 verify that the effects of legal origin 
variables in the particular specifications used here are similar to those found by Beck, et al. 
(2001).  The last three columns of Table 4 present results substituting Scandinavian for 
French legal origin, confirming that Scandinavian legal origin is (somewhat) better than   29
 
French for financial sector development, approximately the same as British and that German 
is potentially several times more conducive than British legal origin to financial sector 
development. 
Table 4:  Legal origin and financial sector development 
Lending to the 
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2  .09 .46 .26 .09  .47  .31 
N  78 94 117  78  94  117 
N.B.  Specifications are as in the first three columns of Table 1a, substituting the legal origin for the 
political variables.  p-values are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. Constants 
and other conditioning variables not reported. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 replicate the regressions in Tables 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b, with the addition 
of the legal origin controls.  Following these earlier tables, Tables 5a and 6a present the 
results of ordinary least squares regressions and Tables 5b and 6b the instrumental variable 
estimates, using colonial heritage variables as instruments.   
From Tables 5a and 6a, it is clear that controls for legal origin reduce somewhat the 
estimated effects of some political variables.  However, in contrast to the results found 
elsewhere in the literature using different political variables, the political hypotheses 
considered here are not rejected in ten of 12 specifications even when controlling for legal 
origin and even recognizing that legal origin may itself capture political effects.  The   30
 
specification does not drive these results since in these same tables, the pattern of results of 
the legal origin variables is similar to that found in Beck, et al. (2001):  German legal origin is 
significantly better for financial sector development than all other legal traditions, while 
British legal origin is frequently significant but of much lower magnitude.   
Two-stage least square results, using the colonial heritage variables as instruments, 
are reported in Tables 5b and 6b.  Results from the first stage regressions confirm the close 
relationship between legal origin and political variables.  Scandinavian and German legal 
origins are significantly associated with competitive elections and newspaper circulation; 
Scandinavian legal origin predicts continuous years of competitive elections in 1975; none of 
the legal origin variables is significantly associated with political checks and balances.   
Table 5a:  Competitive elections, checks and balances and lending to the private 
sector 
  Competitive Elections (1975)  Checks and Balances (1975) 
Lending to the 












































































2  .09 .47 .36 .12  .48  .40 
N  78 93 116  78  93  116 
N.B.  p-values are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. Constants not reported.  
Specifications based on Table 1a, with the addition of legal origin variables. 
   31
 
Table 5b:  Two stage least squares estimates of Table 5a 
First stage regressions 
 Competitive  Elections  (1975)  Checks and Balances (1975) 
Lending to the 
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6.32  2.18 8.25 3.91  1.35 4.63 
Second stage regressions  
 Competitive  Elections  (1975)  Checks and Balances (1975) 
























































.04  .04 .08 .58  .48 .71 
N  78 91  103  78 91  103 
N.B.  p-values are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. Instruments for the 
fourth and eighth regressions are three dummy variables indicating whether a country has British, 
French or Spanish colonial origins.  Constants and conditioning variables not reported.  
Specifications, with the addition of the three legal origin variables, are as in Table 1. 
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The more interesting finding is in the second stage regressions.  Among the 12 
regressions, in only five is even one of the three legal origin variables significant and in none 
is more than one significant; in general, they are highly insignificant.  In eight of the twelve 
regressions, the political variables are significant.  In all cases, their estimated magnitudes are 
only slightly lower relative to the large magnitudes reported in Tables 1b and 2b.  Moreover, 
in all of these cases, the J-statistic supports the validity of the instruments.   
Table 6a:  Continuous years of elections, newspaper circulation and lending to the 
private sector 
  Continuous years of 
competitive elections (1975) 
Average Newspaper Circulation 
(1975-2000) 
Lending to the 












































































2  .14 .50 .45 .21  .52  .51 
N  66 73 88 78  94  115 
N.B.  p-values are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. Constants not reported.  
Specifications based on Table 1a, with the addition of legal origin variables. 
 
From the evidence in Tables 5 and 6 one can conclude that, at a minimum, the 
effects of political checks and balances, political credibility (continuous years of competitive 
elections) and voter information (newspaper circulation) are significant determinants of 
financial sector development even controlling for legal origin.  The effect of competitive 
elections is more fragile, but this was already established in the earlier regressions.   33
 
The two-stage least squares results in Tables 5b and 6b also suggest that historical 
forces associated with colonial heritage drive both subsequent political development and the 
evolution of legal institutions.  Once this exogenous component of the political 
characteristics of countries is isolated the explanatory power of legal origin diminishes.  Legal 
origins are clearly a good proxy for these historical conditions, but the significance of the 
proxies diminishes once the political channels are modeled more explicitly.  Such a claim 
requires more investigation, however, particularly since colonial heritage is itself a black box 
when it comes to understanding these historical conditions.   
It is, finally, instructive to ask why the political results here stand in such stark 
contrast to those in Beck, et al. (2001).  The answer is likely two-fold.  First, the subjective 
measures of political phenomena that they use may overweight the presence of competitive 
elections.  As the evidence here suggests, among all political determinants, competitive 
elections by themselves form a weaker basis for financial sector development.   
Second, although they are careful to test the role played by special interests both in 
theory and in their empirical work, the variables used here may be more apt for the task.  
Unlike the variables used here to capture special interest influence, theirs is never significant.  
The likely reason for this is simply that their proxy is noisier than the variables used here.   
They use the variable special from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), which 
records whether parties in government are committed to a nationalist, rural, regional or 
religious agenda.  Despite the variable label, its best use is likely as a measure of the 
ideological orientation of governments rather of government willingness to reward narrow 
interests in society.  This is the case with the nationalist and religious categories, for example, 
which are not traditional dimensions by which one evaluates the extent to which narrow 
groups in society seek economic benefits from government at the expense of society at large.    34
 
Table 6b:  Two stage least squares estimates of Table 1a 
First stage regressions 
  Continuous years of competitive elections 
(1975) 
Average Newspaper Circulation (1975-
2000) 
Lending to the 
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1.88 3.9  1.91  8.66 1.43  14.01 
Second stage regressions  
  Continuous years of competitive elections 
(1975) 
Average Newspaper Circulation (1975-
2000) 























































.07  .02 .17 .83  .41 .55 
N  66  71 79 78  92 104 
N.B.  p-values are reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. Instruments for the 
fourth and eighth regressions are three dummy variables indicating whether a country has British, 
French or Spanish colonial origins.  Specifications are as in Table 2, with the addition of the three 
legal origin variables.  Constants and other conditioning coefficients not reported.   35
 
At the same time, the willingness of politicians to trade money from special interests 
for favors, or their desire to target specific groups for social benefits at the expense of 
society more broadly, may not be captured at all by this variable.  Governments could be 
entirely driven by clientelist or patronage motives and be indifferent to religious or regional 
interests.  At the same time, governments recorded as religious in the DPI, such as the 
Christian Democratic Party of Germany, are surely more driven to provide public goods 
than the major political parties of Bangladesh, which are not recorded as exhibiting any of 
these four biases.  In contrast, the variables used here, particularly the continuing years of 
competitive elections and newspaper circulation, are linked in the literature to all 
government actions that favor narrow interests at the expense of broad social interests.   
Conclusion 
Three conclusions emerge from this paper. First, consistent with much of the 
literature, political checks and balances are important to the development of the financial 
sector.  This paper is the first to show this systematically with objective data, and more 
importantly, to demonstrate explicitly that the effect of checks and balances passes through 
the security of property rights.  Second, financial sector development depends on the 
willingness of governments to provide public goods, ranging from hospitable regulation to 
secure property rights.  Given that, we would expect political characteristics of countries that 
affect government incentives to provide public goods to be significant determinants of 
financial sector development.  Strong evidence is found for this:  the continuous years of 
competitive elections and newspaper circulation, proxies for the credibility of pre-electoral 
political promises and voter information, are both significant determinants of financial sector 
development.   36
 
Finally, this paper has revisited the debate about politics, legal origins and finance.  
In contrast to earlier work, political variables are robust to controls for legal origins.  
Moreover, evidence is uncovered here that suggests that legal origins are likely to proxy for 
underlying historical and political factors that reflect the willingness of governments to favor 
broad over narrow interests in society.  When this willingness is directly modeled, and one 
controls for the potential endogeneity of political effects, legal origin variables are no longer 
significant determinants of financial sector development.   
These findings, particularly regarding legal origin, are certainly only indicative.  
Further work is needed to understand why legal origins might proxy for historical conditions 
that influence both the political evolution of countries as well as the legal choices that 
countries make.  Similarly, although colonial heritage allows us to identify the effects of 
political variables on financial sector development, they are not particularly revealing of the 
process by which historical factors influence current political institutions and conditions of 
political competition.    37
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